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CONFLICT OF LAW RELATING TO NEGOTIABLE
PAPER, TAKEN AS COLLATERAL SECURITY
FOR ANTECEDENT INDEBTEDNESS.
At the present time, were we without some general rules
of right and regulation, recognized by the civilized nations of
the earth to govern their intercourse with their own States and
with each other, the most serious complications and difficulties
might, and of necessity would, arise. Commerce being now
universal among all civilized nations, the inhabitants of all
having free intercourse with each other, contracts, sales, marriages, etc., are so common among persons whose domiciles are
in different States and in different countries, having different
and even opposite laws on the same subjects, that, without
some common principles adopted by all nations in regard to
such matters, there would be utter confusion of all rights and
remedies; and mighty differences would grow up to weaken
our domestic and foreign relations, which would tend to destroy the obligation of contracts, and to render our property
insecure.
Commercial law is a system of jurisprudence which all
nations engaged in commerce must necessarily recognize; and
upon no subject is it of greater importance that there should
be, as far as it is possible, uniformity of decision throughout
the world. And most especially is this desirable in the several
States of the Union; so that a merchant in one State entering
into any transaction with a merchant of another State, which
is valid at law in his own State, may be sure that, if the
question comes to be considered in a court of a sister State, it
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will be decided in the same manner as in his own. Suppose
that a contract, valid by the laws of the State in which it is
made, is sought to be enforced in another State or country
where such a transaction is prohibited; or, on the other hand,
suppose a contract invalid by the laws of the country where
it is made, but valid in the country in which it is sought to
be enforced. Now it is evident that unless some rules which
shall be uniform are adopted to regulate such cases as these,
manifest injustice must arise, in the settling of differences
between citizens of different countries, in relation to such contracts.
Questions of this kind must occur frequently, not only in
countries which have no dependence upon each other, but also
in those States which are bound together by one great instrument to whose supremacy they all must bow, while at the
same time, in many respects, independent States and subject
only to their own laws. This, of course, must create complications between the citizens of those States.
This is particularly true- in relation to those securities
known as commercial paper.
Bills of exchange and promissory notes are commercial
paper in the strictest sense, and of course must be regarded as
favored instruments, not only because of their negotiable qualities, but also because of their universal use and convenience
in mercantile affairs. Everywhere the rule is that they may
be transferred by indorsement; or, where indorsed in blank, or
made payable to bearer, they are transferable by mere delivery.
Regulations between nations encourage their use as a safe and
convenient medium for the settlement of balances between mercantile men of different countries; and any course of judicial
decision which would tend to restrain or impede their free and
unobstructed circulation for the purpose of foreign or domestic
trade would be opposed to the needs of business transactions.
It is, therefore, of importance that the greatest possible freedom
should be given to the use and circulation of negotiable paper.
The general rule with respect to negotiable paper is, that
one who takes it for a valuable consideration, without any
notice of facts which impeach its validity as between the antecedent parties, if he takes it under an indorsement made before
the same becomes due, holds the title unaffected by these facts,
and may recover thereon, although, as between the antecedent
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parties, the transaction may be without any legal validity.
"This is a doctrine," says Mr. Justice Story, "so long and so
"well established, and so essential to the security of negotiable
"paper, that it is laid up among the fundamentals of the law,
"and requires no authority or reasoning to be now brought
"about in its support."
Neither is the holder of any negotiable paper, before it is due, bound to prove that-he is a bona-

fide holder for a valuable consideration, without notice; for the
law will presume that, in the absence of all rebutting proofs,
and it is incumbent on the defendant, by way of defence, to
satisfactorily prove the contrary, and thus overthrow the frimafade title of the plaintiff.'
Indorsers of negotiable securities enjoyed the protection of
the former rule for ages before any successful attempt was
made to qualify it, unless it should appear that the consideration was illegal, or that the instrument itself was fraudulent in
its inception, or that it had been lost or stolen before it came
to the possession of the holder.2
Throughout the whole line of these decisions it seems that
it was well understood that the title of a bona-fide holder was
not affected by any equities between the antecedent parties.
But it was subsequently decided that if the indorser had no
valid title to the instrument, and that such facts were known
to the transferee as ought to put any prudent man on his inquiry as to whether the transferrer had a right to use the pappr
for his own benefit, then the holder, as against the maker, was
not entitled to recover.3 This ruling was followed for a short
time, but never satisfactorily, and was afterward overruled by
the tribunal from whence it had arisen.4
"Nothing short of fraud, not even gross negligence," says
'Goodman v. Simonds, 20 Howard 343; Berry v. Alderman, 24 Eng.
L. & E. 318; Bayley on Bills, ch. 12, p. 529 to 53i; Arbourn v. Anderson, x A. & E. r. s. 498. In this last case Lord Denman said: "The
"owner of a bill is entitled to recover upon it if he came to it honestly;
"that fact is implied, primafacie, by possession; and to meet the in"quiry so raised, fraud, felony, or some such matter must be proved."
2 Hinton's Case, 2 Show 235; Anon. i Salkeld, 126; Miller v. Race,
i Burr 452; Grantv. Vaughan, 3 Burr 1516 ; Peacock v. Rhodes, 2 Douglas 633; Lawson v. Weston, 4 Esp. 56.
3 CGll v. Cubilt, 3 B. & C. 466.

4 Goodman v. Harvey, 4 A. & E. 870; Azbourn v. Anderson, i A.
&

. r. s.498.
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Mr. justice Story, "if unattended with mala fides on the part
"of the taker of the instrument, will invalidate his title so as
"to prevent him recovering the amount." 1 "Every person,"
says the same, learned author, "is treated in the sense of the
"rule as a bona-fide holder for value, not only one who has ad"vanced money or other value for it, but one who hasTeceived it
"in payment of a precedent debt, or has a lien upon it, or has
"'taken it as collateral security for a precedent debt, or for
"future as well as past advances."
During the period that the rule laid in down in Gill v. Cubiti
seems to have been considered good law, it will be seen that some
of our State Courts accepted the rule, and the evil effects resulting
from these decisions still continue in some of the recent State
decisions, as will be seen by an examination of cases in the
Courts of New York and some other States.
Whether a previous debt is sufficient consideration to constitute a holding for value of commercial paper, is a question
upon which there has been a great conflict of authority in this
country since the case of Coddington v. Bay, decided by Chancellor Kent in New York in 1821.2 This decision introduced
an exception in the general rule of law in respect to negotiable
instruments, that one who has taken such paper before maturity, and in the usual course of business, for a valuable consideration, is a bona-fide holder and is protected against equitiep
between the antecedent parties, of which he, had no notice.
The great authority of Chancellor Kent, who rendered in this
case the opinion which has paved the way for establishing this
new doctrine, has served to obtain its recognition in about half
of the States of the Union in which the point has arisen and
been decided, notwithstanding that the high authority of the Supreme Court of the United States has uniformly been against it.
Upon'a question which is of such vast importance to the
commercial world, it is surprising that such conflict of authority should exist; for upon a question of commercial law
it is most especially desirable that we should have a uniform
line of decisions.
The law respecting negotiable ,instruments was declared
by Iord Mansfield, in the language of Cicero, in Luke v. Lyde,'
I Story on Promissory Notes, 7th Bd., Sec. 232.
2.5 John's Chancery 54, affirmed in 20 Johnson 637.
2

Burr Rp. 883.
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to be, in a great measure, not the law of a single country only,
but of the commercial world: "Non erit alia lex Roma, alia
Athenis, alia nunc, alia post hoc, sed et apud omnes gentes, et
"omni tempore, una eademque lex obtenebit."
And as the inhabitants of the different States of the Union
are constantly engaged with each other in transactions in which
commercial paper is used, it is all the more surprising that this
difference of opinion should exist. As Judge Moncure remarked
in Davis v. Miller,1 "There is, perhaps, no question con"nected with the commercial law which is of more importance,
and upon which, at the same time, there is more distressing
"conflict of authority."
Before proceeding to discuss the question as to whether the
transfer of negotiable paper as collateral security for antecedent debts is a consideration sufficient to protect the holder, in
the absence of fraud or notice, against prior equities existing
between the maker and the payee or indorser, it may be well
to thoroughly understand what is meant by a valuable consideration.
In Comyn's Digest, Actions on the Case, Assumpsit B., page
1-15, it is stated that a valuable consideration, in the sense of
the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or
benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by
the other. Mr. Story, in his work on Contracts, distinguishes
between a good and a valuable consideration. "A good consideration," he says, " is an equitable consideration, founded
"upon mere love, affection or gratitude, which, although it will
"support the contract as between the parties when executed,
"will not support an action to enforce an executory contract.
"But a valuable consideration is a legal consideration eman"ating from some injury or inconvenience
to the one party, or
2
"some benefit to the other."
Chitty says: "Valuable considerations are those which
"confer some benefit upon the party by whom the promise
"is made, or upon a third party at his instance or request, or
"some deteriment sustained at the instance of the party promis"ing by the party in whose favor the promise is made."
Thus it will be seen that a valuable consideration exists
2

1'4 Gratton (Va.) 14.
Story on Contracts, Vol. I, p. 502.
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within the meaning of the law, when the one party has sustained any detriment, or altered his position in any way for
the worse, or where the other party has gained some leniency
or forbearance at the instance of the other.
'Soon after the decision of Chancellor Kent in Coddinglon v.
Bay' in New York, the case of Swift v. Tyson' came before the
Supreme Court of the United States for decision. The facts of
the case were substantially these: A bill of exchange had been
accepted in New York, and this suit was instituted by the holder,
a citizen of Maine. The acceptance and indorsement of the
bill were admitted, and the defence rested on the allegation
that the bill had been received in payment of a pre-existing debt,
and that the acceptance had been given for lands which the
acceptor had purchased from the drawer of the bill, to which
lands the drawer had no title. The bill accepted had been
received in good faith and before maturit y.
There being a
divided Court as to the question in the Circuit Court of New
York, the case was certified to the Judges of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The case was argued with great
ability by counsel, and the judgment of the Court was delivered
by Mr. Justice Story. I do not think I can do better than
quote a porti6n of his judgment. "We have no hesitation,"
he says, "in saying that a pre-existing debt does constitute a
"valuable consideration in the sense of the general rule already
"stated as applicable to negotiable instruments. Assuming it
"to be true (which, however, may well admit of some general"ity of the language) that the holder of a negotiable instrument
"is unaffected with the equities between the antecedents parties,
"of which he had no notice, only where he receives it in the
"usual course of trade and business for a valuable consideration,
"before it becomes due, we are prepared to say, that receiving
"it in the payment of, or as security for, a pre-existing debt is
"according to the known usual course of trade and business.
"And why upon principle should not a pre-existing debt be
"deemed such a valuable consideration ?. It is for the benefit
"and convenience of the commercial world to give as wide an
"extent as practicable to the credit and circulation of negotiable
"paper, that it may pass not only as security for new purchases
"and advances made upon the transfer thereof, but also in
15 John's Chan. 54.
I6 Peters i.
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payment of, and as security for, pre-existing debts.
The
"creditor is thereby enabled to realize or to secure his debt,
and thus may safely give a prolonged credit, or forbear from
"taking any legal steps to enforce his rights. The debtor also
"has the advantage of making his negotiable securities equiva"lent to cash. But establish the opposite conclusion, that
"negotiable paper cannot be applied in payment of, or as security
"for, pre-existing debts, without letting in all the equities
"between the original and antecedent parties, and the value
"and circulation of such securities must be essentially dimin"ished and the debtor driven to the embarrassment of making a
"sale thereof often at a ruinous discount to some third person,
"and then, by circuity, to apply the proceeds to the payment of
"his debts.
What, indeed, upon such a doctrine, would
"become of that large class of cases where new notes are given
"by the same or by other parties, by way of renewal or
"security to banks in lieu or old securities discounted by them,
"which have arrived at maturity ?"
'This case, which has served as a guide ever since for the
Supreme Court of the United States, and those States which
follow its ruling, was the first case of the kind of any importance that came before the Supreme Court; and in his opinion,
Mr. justice Story goes over the whole question very ably, and
reviews the authorities in New York with great ability.
The question had been before the Supreme Court prior to the
case of Swift v. Tyson, and it was decided that it makes no
difference whatsoever, as to the rights of the holder, whether
the debt for which the negotiable instrument is transferred to
him is a pre-existing debt, or is contracted at the time of transfer. In each case, it was said, he equally gives credit to the
instrument.'
Mr. justice Catron dissented from the opinion of Mr. justice
Story in Swift v. Tyson ; but his brief dissent was wholly upon
that ground which renders it quite certain that the whole
Court was aware of the extent to which the opinion of the
Court carried the doctrine of the commercial law upon the
subject of negotiable instruments, transferred or delivered as
security for antecedent indebtedness.
Mr. Justice Catron said, in his dissenting opinion: "I never
ICoolidgev. Payson, 2 Wheaton 66-73 ; Taconsley v. Suvirall, 2 Peters
170-182.
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"heard this question spoken of as belonging to the case, until
"the principal opinion was presented last evening, and there"fore I am not prepared to give any opinion, even if it was called
"for by the record."
Many Judges in those States holding the opposite rule refer
to the note in the case of Swift v. Tyson as being taken
in payment and not as collateral security merely, and that
therefore what was said by Mr. Justice Story was mere dicta;
but I think the language of Mr. Justice Story may be regarded
as having received the assent of the whole Court, with the
And afterward, in his work
exception of Mr. Justice Catron.
on Promissory Notes, Judge Story reiterated and supported the
doctrine laid down in Swift v. Tyson.'
The question next came up in the Supreme Court, in the case
of Goodman v. Simonds.' In this case there was a settlement
of antecedent indebtedness, the surrender of securities, and
making of new notes, the payment of the latter being secured
The Court, however, decided the
by a bill of exchange.
question upon the ground that there was a full present
consideration, and said that the question as to whether a transfer of negotiable securites as collateral security for a pre-existing debt, without more, would make the pedgee a holder for
value in the usual course of business, did not arise, and was,
therefore, not necessary for decision, inasmuch as, at the time
the settlement was made, the new notes were given in payment
of the prior indebtedness, and the collaterals previously held
were surrendered to the defendant, and thetime of payment was
extended and definitely fixed by the terms of the notes, showing, conclusively, an agreement to give time for the payment
of the already overdue debt, and a forbearance to enforce
remedies for its recovery, vhich has, of itself, always been considered a sufficient and valuable consideration.3 But by a reading of the opinion it will be seen that the doctrine laid down in
Swift v. Tyson was undoubtedly regarded as the law by the
Court. And in McCarty v. Roots,' which came up shortly after
the case of Goodman v. Simonds was decided, the question
I See Story on Prom. Notes, p. 215, note I.
2o Howard 243.

3See Story on Prom. Notes, sec. 186 ; Aforlon v. Prom, 7 Ad. & Ellis
i9; Wheeler v. Slocum, 16 Pick. 62.
4 21 Howard 432.
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was squarely presented. Suit was brought by a pledgee holding an accommodation bill of exchange against the indorser.
The bill was held by the pledgee as collateral security for an
antecedent indebtedness, without further consideration. The
Court held (McLean, Justice) that the fact that the bills were
indorsed as stated did not impair the plantiff's right to recover,
and that such an indorsement was a valid transaction within
the usual course of business.
In Oates v. NationalBank1 an extension of time for the payment of an antecedent debt was granted, which, as before stated,
was of itself a sufficient consideration to constitute a holder
for value in the usual course of business. Nevertheless Mr.
Justice Harlan states it as settled law, that one who receives
negotiable paper as collateral security for an antecedent debt,
without notice of any facts which impeach its validity as between the original parties, is a bona-fide holder, and, as such,
protected against equities existing between the original parties.
One of the latest cases, and probably the one best illustrating this doctrine in the Supreme Court of the United States,
is the case of Railroad Co. v. National Bank.2 This case
finally settled the question as far as that Court is concerned.
The railroad company executed its promissory note to the order
of its treasurer. It was made for the purpose of raising money
thereon for the company; it was indorsed in blank, first by the
treasurer and then by Palmer & Co. ; neither the treasurer nor
Palmer & Co. receiving any consideration for their indorsement.
The note was placed with a firm on Wall Street for negotiation aind sale. It was pledged by them afterward to the Bank
as collateral to secure a debt then owing by them to the Bank.
This case had been decided in favor of the Bank in the Circuit Court of New York, and was appealed by the railroad
company to the Supreme Court of the United States, and was
there affirmed with very emphatic opinions by Justices Harlan
and Clifford. Both elaborately consider the question, and anyone reading their opinions must admit that the position
they hold is in all respects based upon the soundest principles. Mr. Justice Harlan says, in summing up the authorities: "Our conclusion, therefore, is, that the transfer
1100 U. S. 249.
2 102 U. S. 16.
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"before maturity of negotiable paper is security for an
"antecedent debt merely, without other circumstances, if
"the paper be so indorsed that the holder becomes a party
"to the instrument, although there is no express agree"ment by the creditor for indulgence, is not an improper
"use of such paper, and is as much in the usual course of
"business as its transfer in payment of such debt. In either
"case the bona-fide holder is unaffected'by equities or de"'fences between prior parties of which he had no notice. This
A differ"conclusion is abundantly sustained by authority.
"ent determination by this Court would, we apprehend,
"greatly surprise both the legal profession and the commercial
"world."
Numerous other cases might be cited to bear out this doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States; but I think
that this case has settled the question so emphatically in that
tribunal that it is unnecessary to mention any others.
The English Courts are unanimous in holding that current
negotiable paper, taken as collateral security for a prior debt, is
Lord Campbell, in
received in the usual course of business.'
giving his opinion in Poirerv. Morris,' remarked: "There is
nothing to "make a difference between this and the common
"case, where a bill is taken as security for a debt, and in that
"case an antecedent debt is a sufficient consideration."
The
doctrine is affirmed in an opinion in the same case by Judge
Crompton: "Whether the bill was a collateral security, or
"whether it had the effect of suspending the payment of the
"antecedent debt, is quite immaterial; the plaintiffs have a
"perfect right to keep the bill."
And so in Currie v. Misa ' it was held that the title of a
creditor to a negotiable security given to him on account of a
pre-existing debt, and received by him bona fide, and without
notice of any infirmity of title on the part of the debtor, is
ipdefeasible, whether that security be payable at a future time
or on demand. Judge Lush here adopted the view that taking
I Poirer v. Mforris, 2 Ellis & Blackburn 89, on appeal; 20 L. & E.
o3 ; Percivalv. Frampton, 2 Cromp. M. & R. ; Bosauquel v. Dudinan,
i Starkie i ; Heywood v. Watson, 4 Bingham 496; Price v. Misa, 16 M.
& W. 232; Currie v. Misa, 14. R. io Ex. '53; Pillaus v. Van Mierop, 3
Burrows, 1664; exparte Bloxham, 8 Vesey, 531.
2Sup ra.
'1L. R., io Exchequer 153.
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collateral security for a pre-existing debt is a conditional payment of the debt. He says : "The true reason is that given
"by the Court of Common Pleas in Belshaw v. Bush' as the
'foundation of the judgment in that case, namely: that a
"negotiable security given for such a purpose is a conditional
"payment of the debt, the condition being that the debt
"revives if the security is not realized."
Lord Coleridge
'dissented from the opinion of the Court, as delivered by Judge
Lush, in an opinion in which he adopts the reasoning of
Chancellor Kent in Coddinglon v. Bay.'

So also in Percival

3
v. Framjlon,
where the note was accommodation paper exe,cuted to enable the maker to obtain advances upon it, the
Court held that the holder of the note, as collateral security
for an antecedent debt, held it free from the equities existing
'between the maker and the indorser, Baron Parke saying
"' that if the note was given to the plaintiffs as a security for a
"previous debt, and they held it as such, they may properly
"be stated to be holders for valuable consideration."
So, where a person has an account with his banker, and the
'banker's acceptances exceed the cash balance in his hands, it is
held that he holds collateral securities in his possession for
value.'
And if one place bills indorsed in blank with his
banker for collection when due, and the banker transfer the
-bills as collateral security to another for a debt of his own,
trover cannot be maintained. 5
The' English House of Lords has applied the rule to checks
-drawn upon a bank as being equally applicable t 9 those
-which were payable on demand as to those payable at a future
time.' The rule, that the holder of negotiable paper received
-as collateral security from an antecedent debt is a holder for
value, is upheld also in the Canadian Courts:" where one
received such paper charged with the duty of presentment, and
'to give notice of non-payment, if necessary, if default is made,

ii Common Bench 191.
John's Chan. 54.

25

32 Crompton, Messon & Pocoe 182.
4 Bosauquel v. Dudman, i Starkie i ; Heywood v. Watson, 4 Bing. 496.
5
Collins v. Marlin, it B. & P. 648.
6
Curriev. Misa, L. R., io Exchequer 153.
7 Peacock v. Purcell,14 C. B. n. s. 728 ; Heywood v. Watson, i M. &
P. 268, on appeal, 4 Bing. 496.
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he is charged with the amount of such securities, as the loss is.
occasioned byhis own neglect.' "The law is clear," said Lord
Kenyon, in Steelman v. Grih,2 "that if in payment of a debt
"the creditor is content to take a bill or note payable at a
"future day, he cannot legally commence an action for his.
"original debt, until such note or bill becomes payable and
"default is made in the payment." And the cases all agree.
that no recovery can be had in any case, upon the original
debt, where the collateral given in security was indorsed whilecurrent and is still outstanding.' In all cases where a party
accepts collaterals as security for a previous debt already due,
there is no implied agreement not to negotiate the collaterals.
before maturity; and this is frequently done among business.
men for the purpose of raising money which ought to have
been paid when the debt matured; so that the collateral may
be said to be always in the interest of the debtor and forhis ease, and collateral securities are not ordinarily received as.
a mere pledge for the debt so as to make the creditor guilty of'
a breach of faith if he negotiates them. All that seems to
to be implied by its being collateral is that there is no implication or agreement that the original debt is extinguished.
The new securities are collateral to the previous debt, running
along with it, as it were, and the creditor is entitled to hold to.
his original debt and all the securities. Simply by the fact.
of its being collateral to the prior debt, it is not affected differently, as between the original parties, than if it were taken in
absolute payment of the debt. It is negotiable in the completest
sense, and is not restricted as to its further negotiation unless.
'by special agreement.
Thus it will be seen that there is but one rule upon the
subject that comes to us from the mother country, in which all
the Courts seem to agree, and that is that a holder of such
negotiable paper before maturity, as collateral to a pre-existing.
debt, is unaffected by any antecedent equities of which he had
no notice.
Now, having shown that the decisions of the Federal Courts.
of the United States and the Courts of Great Britain are
united upon the question, when we come to consider the

I Bank

v. Chambers, ii Rich. 657.
1 Esp. Reports 4.
3Price v. Price, r6 M. & V. 232-243.
2
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question in the Courts of the several States of the Union, we do
not meet with that harmonious line of decision which we have
seen characterizes the Courts of the United States and of
England. On the contrary, we find the greatest confusion
and difference of opinion, by eminent jurists who have presided over our State tribunals, some Courts adhering to the
doctrine laid down by Mr. Justice Story, and others still clinging
to the ruling of Chancellor Kent. The evil results of this
difference of opinion in our own State Courts will be further
evident from the fact that the Supreme Court of the United
States is not bound by the decisions of the .State Courts on
questions of general commercial law, and therefore on appeal
of a case from a State holding to the doctrine of Chancellor
Kent, the case would, of course, be reversed.
It was contended in Szwift v. Tyson that, as the law in New
York State was settled, the Supreme Court of the United
States must follow the decisions of the State tribunals in all
cases to which the 3 4 th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
chapter 2o, applied. That section provides: "That the laws
"of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties,
"or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or
"provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
"common law in the Courts of the United States, in cases
"where they apply." But in delivering the judgment in that
case, Mr. Justice Story says in connection with this point:
"And we have not the slightest difficulty in holding that this
"section, upon its true intendment and construction, is strictly
"limited to local statutes and local usages of the character
"before stated, and does not extend to contracts and other
"instruments of a commercial nature, and the true interpre"tation and effect whereof are to be sought, not in the
"decisions of local tribunals, but in the general principles of
"commercial jurisprudence."

And so in Oates v. National Bank' and in the Railroad
Comiany v. NationalBank' and in numerous cases in which
it has been contended that the Supreme Court must follow the
decisions in certain cases, it has uniformly been held that
upon questions of general commercial law they are not bound
1100 U. S.

239.
2 io2 U. S. 42.

702

CONFLICT OF LAW RELATING TO NEGOTIABLE PAPER.

by State decisions.' And from this state of affairs it will be
seen that all that is necessary for a suitor who has had his
cause decided against him in a Court holding to the ruling of
Chancellor Kent is to appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States if the case is one over which that Court has
jurisdiction, and he is certain to obtain a reversal, if there are
no peculiar circumstances.
In some American cases a distinction is made between
taking a note in payment and one taken merely as collateral
security for an antecedent debt,' though it may be considered
as settled in all our State Courts, except in those of New York,
that, where, a negotiable instrument is taken in payment of a
pre-existing debt, the holder is freed from equities existing
between prior parties. This doctrine seems to have , for a time,
been doubted and denied by the Courts of some of the States;
but it is now generally accepted by most of the States as
being the law.8
The Courts of New York seem to deny all distinction
between taking negotiable paper in payment of an antecedent
debt and simply taking it as a security for the payment of
such debt.' And in this I think they are consistent. The
transactions are, of course, different in form, but the ordinary
cases of taking securities as payment, or as collateral to the
prior debt, are, it seems to me, the same in principle and have
the same effect. One whose debt is due is considered by the
commercial world a bankrupt, if he does not pay it at once;
but if, instead of money, he gives a bill of exchange, or a note
or other negotiable paper, either on time or at sight, whether
this is in the form of payment or as collateral security, he in
either case gains time, and thus, it may be, saves himself the
disgrace and ruin of a bankrupt
1

Carpenter v. Insurance Co., 16 Peters 469; Watson v. Turpley,

18

Howard 517.

See decisions in Pennsylvania and other States, hereafter cited.
See Bank of Covington v. Republic, 5 Rhode Island 52o, and cases.
there cited.
4 Swain v. Treadway, 53 N. Y. 65o; Lawrence v. Clark, 36 N. Y. 128;
Weaber v. Burden, 49 N. Y. 286; Fisherv. Sharpe, 5 Daly 214; Ayer v.
Lypolds, 6 Daly 91; Buhrman v. Baylis, 14 Hun. 608; Rosa v. Brotherton, io Vend. 85; Payne v. Cutter, 13 Vend. 605; Stalker v. McDonald
6 Hill 93; White v. Bank, i Barb. 235. Same case on appeal, 3 Sand.
2

3

222.
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The case of Coddinglon v. Bay,' which was the first of any
consequence in New York, arose in this manner: Bay, the
plaintiff, owned a vessel; he employed R. & S., who were shipcarpenters, to sell her on credit, taking good notes in payment,
and remit to them; R. & S. did sell the vessel and took the
notes of the purchaser, indorsed by another firm; R. & S. delivered the notes so indorsed to the defendants (Coddingtons)
who were at the time under heavy responsibility for R. & S. as
indorsers of notes for their accommodation, payable at different
times, but all subsequent to the delivery of the notes by R. &
S. to the defendants (Coddingtons).
When the notes on
which the Coddingtons were indorsers for R. & S. fell due,
they (Coddingtons) were obliged to take them up; the defendants denied all knowledge as to how the notes came into the
hands of R. & S., and alleged that they believed that they
were the bona-fide and exclusive property of R. & S., and that
they received them with other notes as an indemnity, as far as
they would avail, for their responsibilities. The question was,
under the circumstances, were the defendants holders for value,
and, as such, protected against the equities in favor of the
plaintiff? In delivering the opinion, Chancellor Kent said:
"The notes were not negotiated to them in the usual course of
"business or trade, nor in payment of any antecedent debt or an
"existing one, nor for cash, or property advanced, debt created,
"or responsibility incurred, on the strength and credit of the
"notes. They were received from R. & S. after they had stopped
"payment and had become insolvent within the knowledge
"of the Coddingtons, and were seized upon by them as tabula
"manfrazio, to secure themselves against contingent engage"ments, previously made for R. & S., and upon which they had
"not then become chargeable. There is no case that entitles
"such a holder to the paper, in opposition to the title of the
"true owner. They are not holders for a valuable considera"tion within the meaning or policy of the law." Andcontinuing, he says: "It is the credit given to the paper, and the
"consideration bonafide paid on receiving it, that entitles the
" holder to such extraordinary protection, even in cases of the
"most palpable fraud. It is a necessity of a general rule of
"law, and ought not to be carried beyond the necessity which
"Icreates it."
15 John's Chan.

54.
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On appeal to the Court of Errors and Appeals, the judgment
of the Chancellor was affirmed. Now, it will be seen, from the
extract I have quoted from the opinion of the Chancellor, that
as the notes were not negotiated in payment of an antecedent
debt, or an existing one, property advanced, debt created or
responsibility incurred, etc., they were not holders for value.
But, on appeal, some members of the Court, and among them
the Chief Justice, undertook to say that a pre-existing debt was
not a valuable consideration for the purpose of protecting a
bona-fide holder without notice. The Chief Justice said transferring negotiable paper in absolute payment of an antecedent
debt was not in the usual course of business, and that the debt
must be created at the time. Now, this point seems not to
have been in the case at all, and, therefore, not necessary for
decision.
There is reason to believe that Chancellor Kent afterward
came to another conclusion; for subsequently to writing his
opinion in Coddinglon v. Bay, he added to his Commentaries,
vol. 3, P. 8 1,note R., the following: "Mr. Justice Story, in
"his work on Promissory Notes, page 215, note i, repeats and
'sustains the decision in Swift v. Tyson, I6 Peters 1-22, and
"I am inclined to concur in that decision as the better and
"plainer doctrine." And in reference to this, Mr. Justice Harlan says, in delivering the opinion in the Supreme Court of
the United States in the Railroad Co. v. National Bank:'
"Of course it did not escape the attention of Chancellor Kent
"that the Court, in Swift v. Tyson, declared the equities of the
"prior parties to be shut out as well when the note was merely
"pledged as collateral security for a pre-existing debt as when
"transferred in payment of or extinguishment of such debt."
And in Rosa v. Brotherton' the Court decided positively that
taking negotiable paper in absolute payment of a pre-existing
debt will not free it from equities existing between the original
parties. This case was decided on the authority of Coddington
v. Bay alone. The Court said: "It follows from the princi"ple of this case (referring to Coddinglon v. Bay) that the
"holder of a note, negotiable on its face, who receives it in
"payment of a pre-existing debt, or responsibility incurred,
"takes it subject to all the equities between the original par1 102
2 IO

U. S. 14-25.

Wendall 86.
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"ties. In the language of the commercial law, he has noffaid
"value for it, and therefore is in no better condition than the
"payee. The plaintiff gave no value for the note. He loses
"nothing if the defendant succeeds in his defence. He gave
"nothing for the note, advanced nothing, nor incurred any
"responsibility upon its credit. He has no equity superior to
"that of the maker, and in such case the law leaves him in
"possession who already has it."1
This reasoning is illogical, for has he not given up his
debt on the strength of the paper? And, in fact, in this
case at least, lost his debt? For it appears that he could have
recovered had he proceeded instead of taking the paper; and
yet it is contended that he has given up nothing, and is in no
worse position than he was in at first.
The Supreme Court of that State again decided in Wardell
v. Howell2 that receiving a note as collateral security for the
payment of a pre-existing debt is not in the usual course of
trade, and will not free it of the equities existing between the
maker and indorser, though in this case it was an accommodation note made for a particular purpose, and, having been
diverted from that purpose, did not free it from equities. 3
The case of Coddington v. Bay has been much weakened if
not entirely overruled by some of the later cases in the Supreme Court of New York. 4 In the Bank of Salem v. Babcock, where a note was indorsed and transferred in payment
of an old debt, the securities for which having been cancelled,
the Court held that there was a sufficient consideration, and
precluded all defences as between the original parties.
And so in Bank of Sandusky v. Seaville5 it was held that

where a bank discounts a note to extinguish a debt due to it
1 But see Smith v. Van Loen, 16 Vend. 659, where the Court took occasion to explain the case of Rosa v. Brolherlon, and by reference to the
original papers it was found to beof that character, that the plaintiff could
not have recovered without any such rule. See, also, Bank v. Worthington, 12 Wend. 6oo.
2 9 Wendall 171.
3 Woodhill v. Holmes, io Juhn's Chan. 23 1;Skeldiin v. Warren, 13
John's Chan. 27o; Brower v. Taber,5 lVend. 565; Vallelt v. Parker,6
%Vend. 615.
4

Bank of Salem v. Babcock, 21 Wend. 499; Bank of Sandusky v. Seaville, 24 Wend. 115.
24 Vend. 115.
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from the holder, or where the proceeds are applied toward the
discharge of his liability, such acts are equivalent to baying
value at the time, and constitute the Bank a holder for valuable
consideration. And in Mohawk Bank v. Corey,' the Court
overruled the defence, that the note was transferred for a preexisting debt, because the plaintiff not only took the note in
payment, but gave up the old securities; though it seems
that the Supreme Court holds that this is only applicable to
2
notes transferred as security, and not as payment.
In Francea v. Joseph' it was held that where a promissory
note is handed to a person for discount, and he hypothecates
it with his creditors for a pre-existing debt of his own, the
party taking it cannot retain it against the owner, although
he was ignorant of the way in which it .was obtained; and
though he grants forbearance on the original debt, as was done
in this case, it was held he cannot hold against the true owner.4
The case of Stalker v. McDonald5 came up for decision in
the Supreme Court of New York soon after the case of Swift
v. Tyson was decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, and strong efforts were made to induce the Court to
overrule their decision in Coddinglon v. Baj, and to conform
to the ruling laid down in Swift v. Tyson. But after a careful
reviewing of the authorities on the question, both English and
American, Chancellor Walworth said that he was unable to
come to the conclusion that the settled law of that State was
so manifestly wrong as to authorize the Court to overturn its
former decision for the purpose of conforming it to that of any
other tribunal whose decisions are not of paramount authority.
But they hold that if the note is indorsed, without recourse, in
payment of a pre-existing debt which is at the time discharged,
the holder of it is a bona-fide holder for value, and not subject
to any equities between the original parties. 6 And so, one
taking in exchange a note not then due, which is surrendered,
I I Hill Ry. 512.

"2Manhattan Co. v. Reynolds, 2 Hill 140.
33 Edward Chan. 182.

4 See Wardell v. Howell, 9 Wend. 170.
5 6 Hill 93.

6 Bank v. Gilleland, 23 Wend. 3ir; Bank v. Scoville, 24 Wend. 115:
Youngs v. Lee, 12 N. Y. 551; White v. Bank, 4 Sandf. 222.
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is considered a holder for value.' But it seems that the old
note must be surrendered absolutely before maturity.'
From an examination of the cases in that State, the conclusion which must be drawn from them is, that one taking paper
in absolute paymient of a pre-existing debt is a holder for value;
while he is not such a holder if he takes it in conditional payment; and it seems that generally when paper is spoken of as
being received in payment of a debt, it is meant that it is received in conditional payment. But this distinction does not
seem to be a very sound one; for when paper is taken in conditional payment of an existing debt, if an agreement is not
necessarily implied to forbear the collection of the existing
debt until the maturity of the new paper, does not the condition that the debt shall revive, if the new paper be not collected,
amount to the same thing?
In Pennsylvania, the Courts have held that taking negotiable
paper in payment of a pre-existing debt frees it from equnities
between the original parties, judge Bell saying, in Kirkfiatrick v. Murhead: I "Whatever contrariety of opinion may have
"existed elsewhere, on this subject, it is the undoftbted law of
"Pennsylvania that though the holder of a negotiable instru"ment received in payment of a pre-existing debt, before ma"turityj cannot be subjected to equities which might have fur"nished a defence as between the original parties and of which
"he had no notice."
But they also hold that, if the paper is taken merely as collateral security for the payment of a debt previously contracted,
the defendant may aver any ground of defence which would
have been a good defence between the antecedent parties to the
bill or note.'
In Petrie v. Clark,5 one of the earliest cases in Pennsylvania,
the note upon which suit was brought was indorsed in blank
by the defendant to the executors of one Rodgers, deceased, for
goods purchased from them, which were part of the assets, and
Yoiungsv. Lee, 12 N. Y. 55.
" Bright v. Judson, 47 Barb. 29. See Bigelow on Bills and Notes, 499.
16 Pa. 117-123. See, also, Bardsleyv. Delp, 88 Pa. 420.
4
Petriev. Clark, i i S. & R. 377; Dejean v. Vaddingon, 6 Vhar. 220;
Aippleton v. Donaldson, 3 Pa. 381; Oakford v. Johnson, 2 Miles 203;
Jackson v. Polack, 2 Miles 362 ; Royer v. Keystone Bank. 4 W. N. C. 86.
5Supra.
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the note itself was, consequently, assets in their hands. The
executor, who had this note in possession, was indebted to
the plaintiff on his own promissory note to nearly the same
amount, and, after his note had become due, made an arrangement with the plaintiff by which it was taken up, and a new
note, at five months, substituted in its stead, and the note in
suit was handed over, with the blank indorsement of the payee,
as collateral security for the payment of this debt, the other
executors not being a party to the transaction,'and the plaintiff
being ignorant of the circumstances under which the note in
suit came into the hands of the executors.
The questiQn before the Court was, whether or not the plaintiff was a bona-fide holder for a valuable consideration. Now,
if the note had been given in absolute discharge of the debt,
there is no doubt but that he would be an innocent holder for
a valuable consideration, and, as such, entitled to protection;
and also, according to the decisions in Penilsylvania, if the note
had been given as a pledge for money advanced, at the time of
transfer, in the absence of fraud or collusion, he would be entitled to protection. '.' But," said Judge Gibson, "'as it appears
"on the bill of exceptions that it was given in pledge for se"curing an antecedent debt, which was not discharged, but
"suffered to remain, and as it does not appear that money was
"advanced, or any act done that would in law be a present
"consideration, the case as presented was against the plaintiff."
The record of this case does not show that it was contended
that there was -an extension of time given to the executor by
the plaintiff in consideration of the note left as collateral security, yet the facts of the case seem to indicate plainly that
such was the object, for the record says that the executor was
indebted to the plaintiff on a note to about the same amount as
the note in question, and that the note had arrived at maturity,
and that an arrangement was entered into by which the old
note was taken up, and a note given, payable in five months,
instead, providing the note in suit was left with him as collateral security for the payment of the debt.
No one, I think, will doubt that this was an extension of
time to the executor on the faith of the security; for he gained
five months' time by the transaction, and the plaintiff is certainly in a worse position than he was in at the time of this
agreement. Had he pushed for the money on the old note when
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due, the indications were that he could have recovered; and as
the securities were decided to be unavailable to him, he is certainly placed in a much worse position than he occupied before
the agreement.
And, again, in Deean v. Waddinglon,' in an action of assumpit upon a promissory note, drawn by the defendant Dejean, in favor of Robinson & Smith or order, and by them
indorsed to the plaintiff Waddington, the plaintiff lent Robinson & Smith fifteen hundred dollars on a note, and, as
collateral security, the latter firm placed in the hands of XVaddington a bond for twenty-three hundred dollars of a certain
Edward Miller to Thomas S. Smith, of the firm of Robinson &
Smith. Some time afterward Robinson called on the plaintiff
and stated that he wanted to take the bond away to get it discounted. Robinson & Smith, a week or so after the delivery of
the bond, paid to Waddington eight hundred dollars, and transferred the note to them as collateral security for the amount yet
remaining due. The plaintiff gave up his claim on the bond
for the note and the eight hundred dollars. It seems that the
note of Robinson & Smith to plaintiff was protested, and that
one of the firm came to the plaintiff, and stated that if he
would loan him the bond for a day, he would get the money
on it, and then pay the fifteen hundred dollars. The bond was
delivered to him for that purpose, but was never redelivered to
the plaintiff, nor was the amount due on the note paid according to the understanding between them, but some time afterward eight hundred dollars in cash were paid, and the note in
suit transferred to the plaintiff in lieu of the bond and as collateral security for the note. judge Rodgers, in his opinion,
says: "But although this is so, it has been repeatedly held
"that a collateral security for a pre-existing debt, without more,
"is not such a consideration as will give title to the holder;
"yet if there is any new and distinct consideration, the holder
"is a purchaser for value, and, as such, protected from a de"fence which would have availed between the original parties.
"It seems to me there would be no great difficulty in proving
"that it would have been better not to have restrained the ne"gotiability of paper bonafide pledged as a collateral security
"for a debt, but on this point the law is settled. But where
16 Wharton

220.
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"there is a new consideration, as where it can be shown that
"time was given in consideration of obtaining the note as a
"security for the debt, it would be otherwise." As there was
here an exchange of securities, the bond being of' more value
than the note, it constituted a valuable consideration, since it
appears that if they had retained the bond they would have
been secure, so that'the exchange of' securities made sufficient
consideration.' 'But it was contended in this case that it was
only the exchange of one collateral security for another collateral security. Supposing this to be true, if the bond was of
more value than the note, as it undoubtedly was in this case,
can it be said that he did not relinquish a right? In his opinion
Judge Rodgers expresses regret that the law as to paper pledged
as collateral security for an antecedent debt is as it is, but says
that, as the law is settled, it must be followed, though the contrary doctrine could easily be shown to be better for the commercial world.
Theie are, iii Pennsylvania, decisions on this point almost
without number; but as they are to the same effect, it is sufficient for the present purposes to simply cite a few more.'
The Courts all agree that if any new consideration enters
into the transaction-for example, an additional loan or advancement made at the time, or some new responsibility incurred, or a stipulation for delay or credit, or a change of
securities, or the like-the holder is protected from the infirmities affecting the instrument before it was transferred.'
A surrendering of collaterals previously given, or affording
increased indulgence as to time, is a sufficient consideration for
an assignment of negotiable paper by way of collateral. 4
It has been held that a note transferred to a judgment credi-

I See Hornblower v. Prowd, i B. & A. 233, where it wag held that an
exchange of securities constituted a good and valuable consideration.
2
Notter v. Skififpen, 2 Barr 358; Afpleton v. Donaldson, 3 Barr 381;
Kilfatrick v. Murhead, 4 Harris 117; Sitg-raves v. Bank, 13 Wright 359;
Lenham v. Wilmarding, 5 P. F. Smith 73; Ashton Appeal, 23 P. F.
Smith 153; Pratt's Appeal, 27 P. F. Smith 378.
3 Dejean v. Waddinglon, 6 Wharton 220; 41bpileton v. Donaldson,3 Pa.
St. 381 ; Ruddick v. Lloyd, 13 Iowa 441; Nelson v. Edwards, 40 Barb.
N. Y. 479; Traders'Bank v. Bradner,43 Barb. 379.
4 Goodman 4. Sinonds, 2o Howard 342; Bank v. Watson, 42 N. Y.
490; Brown v. Levitl, 21 N. Y. 1 3 ; White v. Bank, 3 Sandf. 222.
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tor as security for the payment of the judgment, and in consideration of his discontinuing proceedings supplementary to
execution then pending against the debtor, was supported by a
sufficient consideration.'
All authorities concur in holding that if there is any change
in the legal rights of the parties in relation to the antecedent
debt, the creditor taking the collateral is deemed to be a
bona-fide holder for value, and therefore protected against prior
equities.'
In the case of further time being granted to the creditor, although the real object in giving collateral security is to gain time
for the payment of the debt, yet this purpose will not avail unless there is a definite agreement to delay.' The mere fact
that the creditor, after having received the collateral security, does forbear to enforce his claim, or does grant indulgence, does not prove that such indulgence or forbearance
was the consideration for the giving of the security. Forbearanqe without any definite agreement to forbear is a
mere voluntary act, and not to be considered as a consideration for the giving of security.' The right to enforce
the original debt is regarded as suspended when the creditor
who takes collateral security expressly agrees to keep the original obligation until the collateral becomes due and is unpaid.An agreement of that sort is, in effect, one not to enforce the
original bill in the meantime; and such seems to be the effect
when one receives a second bill in renewal of the first, for then
creditors mutually undertake not to enforce the first. 6
While holding to this rule, the Courts introduce an exception when the paper so taken is what is known as accommodation paper, and in all the States, with the exception of
Maine, hold that one who takes such paper as security for a

' Boyd v. COmImings, 17 N. Y. 107.
'Nagle v. Yunman, 14 California 450, opinion of Field, C. J.
:Atlantic NationalBank v. Franklin,55 N. Y. 235 ; Whitney v. Goin,
2o N. H. 354; Body v. Jenson, 23 Wis. 402.
4 Fenoville v. Hamilton, 35 Ala. 319; Railroad Co. v. Barker, 29 Pa.
i6o.
'

Gould v. Robson, 8 East. 516.
See Kendyick v. Lomax, 2 Crompt, J.405.
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prior debt, takes it freed from equities existing between the
antecedent parties.'
In Lord v. Ocean Bank,2 an action of assumpsit was brought
by the Bank against Lord upon a promissory note made by
Lord in favor of one Daniel Adee, and by him indorsed to the
Bank as collateral security for a pre-existing debt of the payee
(Adee). It "was admitted that there was no consideration between Lord and Adee, and that it was a mere accommodation
note. In deciding this case, Black, C. J., said: "The maker
"of an accommodation note cannot set up the want of consid' eration as a defence against it in the hands of a third person,
"though it be taken as collateral security merely. He who
' chooses to put himself in front of a negotiable instrument for
"the benefit of his friend must abide the consequence, and has no
"more' right to complain if his friend accommodates himself by
"pledging it for an old debt than if he had used it in any other
"way. Accommodation paper is a loan of the maker's credit
"with6ut restriction as to the manner of its use." And so in
Appleton v. Donaldson,I a case similar to Lord v. Ocean Bank,

Rodgers, J., said: "We think that when a person gives another
"an accommodation note, it contains an authority to use it in
"the payment of an existing debt, to sell or discount it, or, if
more to his interest, to pledge it as a collateral security
"for money advanced at the time or before advanced, or on a
"running account between the parties, or for money advanced
"at the time, before, or afterwards; "in short, that he has the
"complete control to use it, as the name imports, for his own
"benefit or accommodation in any manner he may judge
"best calculated to advance his own interest. If he can pre"vent a suit against him by pledging the note intentionally
"drawn in the usual commercial form, and intended to be used
"without restriction, and by this means preserve his credit and
"save himself from utter ruin, there is nothing I can see, either
"in law or in morals, to prevent him. Of what consequence
'Redbank v. Bank, 5 Wend. 66; Granderv. Leroy, 2 Paige; Lathrop
v. Morris,5 Sanford 7; Bank v. Corey, i Hill, 513 ; Applelon v. Donaldson, 3 Pa. 386; Lord v. Ocean Bank, 20 Pa. 384; Work v. Case, 34 Pa.
138; Strutherv. Kendall,4r Pa. 214; Cumming v. Boyd, 83 Pa. 372; Ashton's Appeal, 73 Pa. 153; Hutchinson v. Boggs, 28 Pa. 294.
2 Supbra.
3 3 Pa. St. 386.
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"is it to the maker whether he sells the note, gives it as a col"lateral security for a debt already contracted, or for money
"advanced at the time of the transaction ? Accommodation
"paper, I take it, is a loan of the credit of the maker to the
"extent of the value of the note, for the benefit of the payee
"without restriction." 1 And continuing, he says: "As far
"as any legal question is concerned, it is of no sort of conse"quence whether the note was taken as a collateral security for
"an antecedent debt, or money advanced at the time the note
"was received on pledge, as in either case the plaintiff is
"entitled to recover, unless there is some other defence." 2
The reason, then, it will be seen, that has induced the Courts
of Pennsylvania, and of the other States so holding, to establish this rule as to accommodation paper, while they hold exactly the contrary as to other negotiable paper, is, that the paper
was given for that purpose-i.e., raising money on it-and
he is equally raising money on it, whether he has it discounted
and receives money for it, or uses it in payment of his debt, or,
as in these cases, uses it as collateral security for a debt he is
owing, thus enabling him, it may be, to continue in his business, for a period at least, or to induce his creditors to forbear pressing him.
Therefore they do not base their decisions on the fact that the holder is a purchaser for a valuable
consideration, but because accommodation paper is a loan of
the maker's credit without restriction. 3 But if the accommodation paper was made to serve a particular purpose and it has
been diverted from that purpose, or some other equity exists in
favor of the maker, it is necessary that the holder should have
parted with value on the faith of the note in order to cut off
such equity of the maker. That is, he must have taken it in
some other way than as collateral security for an antecedent
debt.' Though if the holder of an accommodation note has
parted with a consideration on the faith of it, the mere fact of
1 See FJelrie v.

Clark, ii S. & R. 239; Dejean v.

Waddinglon, 6

Wharton 23.

" See Work v. Kase, 34 Pa. 138; Stlruthers v. Kendall,41 Pa. 214.
3 See Dorman v. Insurance Co., 13 Leg. Intel. 77, opinion by Lowrie,
C. J.; and IMest v. Bank, i5 Leg. Intel. 316; Holnes v. Paul,5 Clark
461 ; Troller v. Skififen, 2 Pa. St. 335; Garrand v. Pittsbui-g & Connellsville R. R. Co., 29 Pa. St. i6o; Cumming"v. Boyd, 83 Pa. 377.
4 Hoore v. Ryder, 63 N. Y. 438; Bank of Rutland v. Buck, 5 Wend.
66 ; Crandall v. Vicksey, 43 Barb. i56.
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its having been diverted from its purpose is not a defence to his
action upon it. To constitute that-a good defence, it must be
shown that the holder had notice of -its restricted qualities.'
And so it-necessarily follows that such paper can be impeached
in the2 hands of the holder for fraud in its making or procurement.

The other States of the Union seem to be about equally divided on the question, and-therefore a short review of their decisions will suffice. for all present purposes-, taking up those
first which hold to the ruling of Chancellor 'Kent.
In Alabama the decisions do not show that they rely upon
good reasoning, in holding that one who 'takes commercial
paper as collateral security for the payment of a pre-existing
debt is not a purchaser for value, their doctrine being that, as
the law is settled, they ought not to depart from the law as laid
down.'
Even where forbearance- is granted, they hold the
same rule; ' but if the paper is taken in absolute payment, it is
sufficient to constitute a good consideration.'
And if the debt
is created at the time of transfer, they hold him protected. 6
In Arkansas, the mere taking of a negotiable instrument as
collateral security for an antecedent debt is not such a consideration as to cut out equities-between the antecedent parties;
but if the paper is taken in absolute payment at.the time of
transfer, they hold it to be a sufficient consideration.7
The Courts of Iowa hold that a note transferred in satisfaction
of an antecedent debt is transferred for a valuable consideration;I but they refuse to so decide when the paper is taken
merely as collateral security for an antecedent debt, holding
that such a transfer does not give the indorsee the rights of a
holder for value.9
I'erchants' Bank v. Comstock, 33 N. Y. 24; Mailland v. Citizens'
Bank, 4o Md. 54o.
2 Cummings v. Boyd, 83 Pa. 377.
3 Fenoville v. Hanillon, 35 Ala. 319; Boyer v. Beck, 29 Ala. 703;
31cKensie v. Bank, 28 *Ala. 6o6; Anderson v. McCoy, 8 Ala. 920;
Bank v. Hall, 6 Ala. 639; Cullum v. Bank, 4 Ala. 21.
4 Bank v. Reid, 70 Ala. 199; Miller v. Boykins, 70 Ala. 469.
5 Mayberry v. Morris, 62 Ala. 113; Bank v. Hiase, 6 Ala. 639.
6 Millerv. Boykins, 7o Ala. 469; Boykins v. Bank, 72 Ala. 262.
7 Bertrandv. Barkman, 13 Ark. i5o.
S Johnson v. Barry, i Iowa 531.
. Iowa College v. Hill, 12 Iowa 462; Ruddick v. Lloyd, 13 Iowa 441
Davis v. Strohm, 17 Iowa 421; Ryan v. Chew, Q3 Iowa 5S9.
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In.Ruddick v. Lloyd' the Court said: "The assignee of
"negotiable paper receiving it in good faith from the payee
"without notice, and before maturity, as collateral security for
"a pre-existing debt due him by the payee, where no new
"consideration, stipulation for delay, or credit be given, or
"right parted with by the creditor, he is not a holder of the
"collaterals for value, in the usual course of trade, and takes
"it subject to all the equities which may exist against the
"payee, in favor of the maker, at the time of the assignment."
They hold that it is otherwise if he takes the note for value, as
in consideration of a Ican, or advancement, or in payment of
the pre-existing debt, or on further time being granted to pay
the original debt, or for a change of securities or the like.
In Iowa College v. Hill2 there is a very interesting opinion
by Judge Wright, in which he supports the rule, and reviews
the authorities with considerable ability.
In Kentucky the Courts adhere to the rule laid down by
Chancellor Kent,' though, if taken in absolute payment of the
debt, the indorsee is protected. 4
So also in the Maine, 5 in the case of Brammell v. Beckel,' it
was an accommodation note given for the purpose of raising
money, which, by the law of Pennsylvania and most of the
other States, shut out prior equities.- Judge Howard said, in
deciding Brammell v. Becket, that "as he was a mere indorsee
"of an accommodation note or bill anyhow, and having given no
"consideration for it, and is one who does not therefore claim
"through a party for value, he is not entitled to protection against
the equities of the accommodation maker, acceptor or indorsers;
"in the language of Eyre, C. J. (I Bos. & Pul. 65o), 'he is in
"'privity with the first holder, and will be affected by everything
"' that would affect the first holder.'" Now, its being an accommodation note or bill would be- the very essential thing that
13 Iowa 441.
12 Iowa 471.

"'Lee v. Staeed, I Met. (Ken.) 628; M ay v. Quinby, 3 Bush. (Ken.) 96;
Breckenridge v. M1oore, 3 B. Ion. (Ken.) 629.
4
Alexander 6- Co. v. Springfield Bank, 2 Met. 535.
'Brammell v. Becket, 31 Me. 205, but otherwise when taken in abso-

lute payment; see Holnes v. Smythe, 16 Ale. 177. 3oron v. W1aile, 20
Me. 175.

Sitpra.
7 Lord v. Ocean Bank, 20 Pa. 384.
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would entitle the holder to protection in Pennsylvania; or, to
use the words of Black, C. J., "If one gets into the front of a
"negotiable instrument, for the benefit of his friend, he cannot
"be heard to complain if his friend oblige himself by pledging
"the paper for a debt of his own."
In other words, it is held
that an accommodation note is a loan of the maker's or indorser's credit for the value of the note without restriction as to
t e manner of its use.
In Minnesota they seem to follow the New York rule,
though it is not very clear,' and also in Mississippi,2 though
the contrary rule seems to have been laid down in Harrisonv.
Pike & Co., 8 but that case seems to have been decided on the
law of Louisiana, as the transaction took place there. If the indorsee has collected the securities and placed the amount to the
credit of the debtor, he is considered a bonafide holder.4
In New Hampshire it is held that where a negotiable note
is indorsed bonafide, before it is due, without any notice of
any defence existing against it, the transfer is as valid, perfect
and effectual, as if it had been received in payment for goods
sold, or in the course of any other commercial dealing.'
On
the other hand, when a note is transferred in pledge merely,
as a collateral security, the general property remains in the
indorser; the indorsee takes it as he would a chose in action
not negotiable, and subject to any defence that might be made
to it in the hands of an indorsee arising prior to the time when
notice is given of the indorsement. 6
In Williams v. Little, Parker, C. J., argued that, in the first
case (i.e., in payment), by taking in payment of a precedent debt he has parted with a right, because he cannot,
after such payment and discharge, maintain an action upon
the debt he has thus discharged; and in the second case, he
says it is an indorsement in pledge merely. The general property still remains in the payee; if it is collected, it will pay so
1

Beeker v. Sandusky Bank, i Minn. 31o.
Brooks v. Whelson, 7 S. & M. Miss. 513 ; Harrisonv. Pike & Co., 48
Miss. 57; Bank v. Lewes, 13 S. & M. 226.
8Supra.
2

4Bank v. Lewes, supra.
5 Williams v. Little, ii N. H. 66; Goss v. Emerson, 3 Poster 428;
Bank of Woodstock v. Kent, I3 N. H. 581.
6 Williams v. Little, supra; Jenness v. Bean, io N. H. 267; Bank v.
Kent, 13 N. H. 581 ; Pletcher v. Chase, 16 N. H. 39.
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much of his debt to the plaintiff; if not, the debt still remains,
and the loss is his loss and not that of the indorsee; the indorsee has only a special property in the note, the general property remaining in the payee. True it is that the debt still
remains, and he still can have an action upon it. But is he
situated as he was before? The payee of the note now being
insolvent, can it be said that his position is not worse than
before? His forbearance to sue, in this case, cost him the debt,
and it is said that the debt still remains, and that he has action
upon it. It certainly does remain; but of what avail is it now
that the payee is insolvent? It seems that a negotiable note in
the hands of an indorsee who has taken it as collateral security
for a debt contracted at the time of transfer is subject to the
same defences to which it would have been subject in the
hands of the indorser who pledged it.1
In Ohio the point came up very prominently in the case of
Roxborough v. Airessick el al., and it was held there by the

Court, Justice Shaw delivering the opinion, that when the note
of a third person is transferred bonafide, before maturity, as
collateral security, and for value, as in consideration of a loan
or advancement, or a stipulation expressed or implied, for further time to pay a pre-existing debt, or a further credit, or a
change of securities for a pre-existing debt, or the like, theassignee of such collateral would be protected from infirmities
affecting the instrument before it was transferred.
They also hold that when a debt is created, without any
stipulation for further security, and the debtor, without any
obligation to do so, voluntarily transfers a negotiable instrument to secure the pre-existing debt, and both parties are left,
in respect to the pre-existing debt, in slatu quo, without incurring any new responsibility, parting with any right, or subjecting himself to any loss or delay, the holder has not taken the
note in the usual course of trade and for value, and is subject
to the defences as between the original parties to the paper. 3
This case was before the Superior Court of Ohio,' where it
was decided by that Court, in a very able opinion, that the in-

' Rice v. Railt,

17 New Hamp. r16; Fletcherv. Case, 16 New Hamp.

39.

6 Ohio State 448.
3

Roxborouglz v. Messick, 6 Ohio St. 454.
4 r Handy Reports 348.
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dorsee of a bill of exchange or promissory note, received in
good faith, before maturity, as collateral security for an existing debt, is protected from all the equities of the maker, or acceptor, of which he had no notice at the time of transfer.
Before the ruling in the case of Swift v. Tyson, 1 the Supreme
Court of Ohio had held to the rule laid down in Coddington v.
Bay;' & I but after the decision in Swift v. Tyson the same
Court reviewed their former decisions, especially Riley v. Johnson, 4 and used the following language: "It is believed that the
"law, as thus settled by the highest judicial tribunal in the
Lcountry, will become the uniform rule of all, as it is now of
"most of the States, and, in a country like ours, where so much
"communication and interchange exist between the diflerent
"members of the confederacy, to preserve uniformity in the
"great principles of commercial law, is of much interest to the
"commercial world.' ,5
This was again admitted to be the correct ruling in Gordon
v. Kearney,' the Court remarking that they did not perceive
any difference in principle between an advance of money and
a balance suffered to remain on the faith of mutual dealing.
In the one case as in the other, credit is given upon the faith
of the paper deposited.
These decisions were afterward overruled by the case of Roxborough v. Afessick el al., and the ruling in that case is believed
to be the law at the present day.
In JMormley v. Lourey,7 Justice Green said: "Where one
"receives a note for a pre-existing debt, he parts with nothing.
"He is in the same position after a successful defence by the
'He is in the
"maker that he was before he took the note."
t (same position"-how can that be made to appear? He has
allowed the collection of his debt or its security to cease for the
time being; and is not this often fatal in such matters? And
has he not incurred the trouble and expense of litigation? Truly,
then, can it be said that he is in the same situation? In one
1 6 Peters i.
220Johns
637. 3 Rileyv.Johnson, 8 Ohio 526.
4Sup ra.
5Carlislev. WVishari, ii Ohio 172.
617 Ohio 375.
adeau, 3 Hump.
7I Humphrey (Tenn.) 468. See, also, Ingham v. I£
51 ; and, contra, see io Yerge? 304.
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respect, at least, he is-his debt is still unpaid, and he is again
out of court.
In King v. Doolittle' it was decided that the transfer of nego-'
tiable paper in payment of, or as collateral security for, a preexisting debt is not a transfer in the due course of business, so
as to free it from the antecedent equities, though it appears
from the Judge's opinion that the case was decided that way,
more because it was the law of Pennsylvania, where the contract
2
of indorsement was made, than because of his own convictions.
In Virginia the question may be considered as unsettled. In
Davis v. Miller,3 Judge Moncure refers to the case of Prenlise
v. Zane4 as the only one in that State bearing upon the subject; and this case seems to have been based upon the supposed
correctness of the New York rule. Judge Moncure, referring
to the last-mentioned case, said: "The note in that case was
"made in Philadelphia, and the decision conformed to the well"settled law of the place of the contract. Whether the case
"would have been decided the same'way if the note had been
"a Virginia contract is uncertain."
In Wisconsin it is settled that taking negotiable paper as
security for antecedent indebtedness is not in the usual course
of business, and for that reason is not protected from prior equities ;5 though in the case of Cook v. Helins' the Judge based his
decision on the ruling laid down in Staleer v. AfcDonald. If
the negotiable paper is taken in absolute payment of the debt,'
or if previous securities are surrendered, 9 this is held to be a
valuable consideration.
This about completes the list of the States in which the ruling in Coddinglon v. Bay is upheld; and it will now be necesIi Head (Tenn.) 88.

also the following cases: Vamoyel v. Sorw,,ell, 3 Hump. 192;
Mare v. Children, 6 Hump. 443; Nichols v. Bates, io Yerger 429; Xaiier
v. Elaw, 6 Yerger ioS.
3 14 Gratton i.
4 2 Gratton i.
5
Bownan v. 'zanKeuren, 29 Wis. 209; Body v. Jiensen 33 Wis. 402;
Jenkins v. Schwab, 14 Wis. 1; Stevens v. Campbell, 13 Wis. 375; SIMfeldt v. Fease, 16 Wis. 66o.
r'5 Wis. b07.
6 Hill 93.
8Atchinson v. Davidson, 2 Pinney 48; Rice v. Cutter, 17 Wisconsin
21; Kellogg v. Faucher,23 Wis. 21.
SKnox v. Clifford, 38 Wisconsin 657.
2See

720

CONFLICT OF LAW RELATING TO NEGOTIABLE PAPER.

sary to consider briefly those States in which the opposite rule
is recognized.
From an examination of the decisions of the several States
just mentioned, it will be seen that Courts seem to lay great
stress on the law as laid down by the Courts of Pennsylvania
and New York, and seem to think as the law on this question
in those States is as it is that they ought to follow it, thus
showing that they have great respect for the decisions of our
State and of our sister State. Now, if we have several of the
States of the Union relying upon us for good law upon a question of such grave importance as this, we should strive to
lay down a principle that will be of the greatest possible benefit to the necessities of business life, and not to lead them
blindfold into a doctrine which is, at best, only plausible.
Before proceeding to consider the decisions in the other States
it may be well to state just what objections the Courts of States
holding to the doctrine of Coddinglon v. Bay have for not following the rule laid down by that distinguished jurist, Judge
Story.
The objections that they usually urge are:
First.-That taking negotiable paper as security for an antecedent debt is not in the usual course of business.
Second.-That upon the transfer of negotiable paper merely
as collateral security for an antecedent debt, nothing is surrendered by the indorsee; that to permit the equities between
prior parties to prevail, deprives him of no right or advantage
enjoyed at the time of transfer; imposes upon him no additional burdens, and subjects him to no additional inconveniences.
As to the first objection, I do not believe that it is sustained
by the usages of the commercial world. The transfer of the
negotiable paper as security for antecedent debts constitutes a
material and prominent portion of the commerce of a country.
Such transactions have become very frequent in financial circles.
They have of necessity grown out of business transactions, and,
in this advanced age of commercial activity, they are largely to
the benefit of both debtor and creditor.
This being so, can it be said, then, that such a transaction is
not in the known course of business or trade?
Mr. Parsons, in his work on Promisory Notes and Bills of
Exchange, treats the question of the transfer of negotiable
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paper under three heads, one of which is where the paper is
transferred or received as collateral security for antecedent debts.
In reference to this he says "that, when the principles of the

"law merchant have established more firmly and unreservedly
"their control and their protection over the instrument of the
"merchant, all of these transfers (not affected by peculiar cir"cumstances) will be held to be regular and to rest on a valua"ble consideration." 1
It has now become a common thing to present notes to a
bank to be discounted, and offer other notes as security for
them, and, when the notes given as security for them become
due, to renew them; and I cannot see what valid objection can
be made to this transaction, or any good ground for holding
that the bank shall be open to all defences against the note they
have taken as security, and yet not open to the defences against
the note which they discount.
I do not think that the Courts could decide that this is
an improper use of negotiable paper without injuring its usefulness, and thereby placing a stumbling-block in the way of
mercantile transactions.
As to the second objection, it may be true in some cases, but.
I think, in very few. For can it be said in the great bulk of
such transactions, where a note is indorsed and given either in
payment of, or as a security for, an antecedent debt, that the
note then given can be withdrawn or annulled, at the same
time leaving the party so. taking it in as secure a position as he
was before? Of course he still holds his claim against the
transferrer, but can it be said that he is not in a more disadvantageous position than he otherwise would have been?
In a great number of cases the transfer is the result of a bargain by which the debtor gains either some delay or forbearance, or the giving up by the transferree of some means of
collecting his debt at the time of transfer.
The learned author, in the work last mentioned, again says
"that it would be one thing to hold that an indorser of nego" tiable paper, who can surrender it and still be in all respects
"as well situated as if he had not taken the paper, should be
"open to the defences available against his indorser. But it
"would be another thing, and very different thing, to hold that
Parsons on Notes and Bills, 221.
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'"all indorsers for an antecedent debt or for collateral security
"are in[the same position." I
Few cases have, ,it is presumed, arisen in which the interest
of the debtor is not the main thing to be benefited; so that if
the rule should be confined to that class of cases falling within
the abstract theory of such a defence, the question would cease
to be of much importance, nor would it often be true that if
the title of the holder were impeached he could be said to be in
as good a position as before.
In California the Courts accept the ruling in Swift v. Tson
without expressing much of an opinion on the subject, though,
in Robinson v. Smith, "Judge Baldwin said: "A man receiving
" such security, and suspending proceedings to collect his debt,
"would very often find that he had lost his debt by taking the
"security, if defences could be set up against the paper. In
older communities, where a different rule obtains, it has been
"argued with more force than it could be here that, merely from
"receiving an additional security for a debt and surrendering
"nothing, the creditor, cannot be considered a bona-fide pur"chaser for value, since he neither gives nor loses anything in
"the transaction. The general workings of the rule, as we
"have held it here, would be beneficial, and this is as much as
"can be said of any proposition of commercial law; and it
"has, besides, the great advantage attributed to it by Chancel"lor Kent I of being the 'plainer rule.' "
In Connecticut, beginning with Brush v. Scribner,5 the Courts
of that State have adhered to the rule stringently.
They
recognize no distinction between taking negotiable paper in
payment of an antecedent debt and taking it as security for
such. 6
In Delaware it is held that where a negotiable note is taken
in payment for an existing debt, it is founded on good consideration, and that neither fraud nor want of consideration as
between the original parties can be set up as a defence against
'Parsons on Notes and Bills, page 220.
14 California 99.
3 3 Kent Comm. 81, note B.
4See also Payne v. Beusly, 8 Cal. 26o; Naylor v. Lyman, 14 Cal.
450.
3

Conn. 388.

6Bank v. Bates, 8 Conn. 507 ; Bank v. Welsh, 29 Conn. 473 ; Roberts v.
Hall. 37 Conn. 205: Oswego v. Banzk, 30 Conn. 27.
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the indorsee.' I have been unable to find a reported case in
Delaware in which negotiable paper was taken merely as collateral security for an antecedent debt, and hence infer that
such a case has never been before the Courts of that State; so
that it is safe to say, with reference to Delaware, that the question is unsettled.
In Georgia the same rule has been followed. Beginning with
the first case on the subject, Bond v. CenlralBank, it has been
held to the proper ruling ever since.2
In Bond v. Bank the point did not, however, come directly
before the Court, that case being decided on the ground that the
paper was taken in payment of the debt; but it was soon after
settled in Gibson v. Connor' that there was no difference between
taking paper in payment of, and as collateral security for, an
antecedent debt. In Afeadow v. Bird' two of the Justices dissented, and filed very strong dissenting opinions.
So, also, in Illinois, beginning with Hancock v. Hodgson,' the
Supreme Court of that State has adhered to the rule.' In
Alanning v. Afcdlure Mr. Justice Lawrence reviews the decisions
very elaborately, and in the course of his argument says: "What
"'inducement has the debtor to part with his negotiable paper
"except the expectation of further forbearance? Would he
"think of parting with it, if he expected his creditor would
"immediately bring suit against him, notwithstanding the in"dorsement?
When the creditor seeks his delinquent debtor,
"is not his language in substance, 'I must bring suit unless
" 'you secure me;' and when the debtor has turned over his
"collateral, without taking an express promise or agreement to
"forbear, does not good faith, nevertheless, require forbearance?
"And is it not generally given among right-minded men?
"Having received the securities, the creditor believes himself
"safe. He is lulled into quiet and neglects to take suc h' steps
'Bush V'.
Peckard,3Harrington 388; Corbil v. Bank of Smlyrna, 2 Harr.
236.
2 2 Georgia io6; Gibson v. Connor, 3 Georgia 47; Afeadow v. Bird, 22
Ga. 246.

3Snpra.
4Sinra.,
54 Scan, 329.

M3ayo v. M"oore, 21 Ill.
42S; A/anning v. fcClure, 36 Ill.
490; Butler v. Hanhout, 42 Ill.
iS ; Bowman v. Mfillison, 58 Ill.
36; Doolittle
v. Cook, 73 Ill. 354.
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"to procure the payment of his debt as prudence would have
"required, but for the fancied securities in his hands."
And
it also may be stated that in Butter v. Hanghout' the Court
of this, State decided that this rule applied also to chattels transferred as security for an antecedent debt.
The Supreme Court of Indiana holds to the same opinion.2
So do the Courts of Louisiana 3 and Maryland. 4
In reviewing the authorities in Maitland v. Bank, the Court
said: "Apply the principle just stated before us" (referring to
Swift v. Tyson), "and there can be no doubt of the sufficiency of
"the consideration for the transfer of the note to the plaintiff,
"whether it was as collateral security for a pre-existing debt
"or a contemporaneous debt, or to secure future discounts or
"advances, or all combined. In either case, the consideration
"would be valuable in the sense of the rule which protects the
"holder of negotiable paper, and the plaintiffs would be entitled
"to the full benefit of the security, unless mala fides or notice
"of such facts as will impeach its title to the note be shown."
In Massachusetts they have some admirable decisions sustaining this doctrine.' In Blanchardv. Stevens,' Judge Dewey,
in a very able opinion, in which he goes very carefully over the
ground, said: "If the party had not received the note as col"lateral security, he might have pursued other remedies to en"force the security or payment of the debt. He might have
"obtained other securities or perhaps payment in money." It
"is a fallacy to say that if the plaintiffs are defeated in their
"attempt to enforce the payment of these notes, by allowing
"this defence to prevail, yet, nevertheless, they are in as good
"a situation as they would have been in if the notes had not
"been transferred to them. That fact is assumed and not
"proved, and, from the very nature of the case, is a matter of
"entire uncertainty. The convenience and safety of those
"dealing in negotiable paper seem to require and justify the
142 Ill.
18.
1n re Wiley v. Bissell, 171; Valette v. Afason, I Ind.288.
8Geovanovuk v. Bank, 26 La. I5 ; Succession of Dolbid, 21-La. 3;
Bank
v. Garemd, 21 La. 555; Smith v. Frain,2Z La. 434.
4
Cecil Bank v. Heald, 25 Md. 563 ; lMail/and v. Bank, 4o Md. 540.
5 Blanchardv. Stevens, 3 Cush. 162; Bank v. Chapin, 8 Met. 4o; Celver v. Benedict, 13 Gray 7; Stoddart v. Kimball,6 Cush.; Jewellv. Warren,
12 Mass. 30; Fisherv. Fisher,98 Mass. 302; LeBreton v. Pierie,2 Allen 8.
2

6

Supra.
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"rule that when a person takes a negotiable note not overdue,
"or apparently dishonored and without notice, actual or con"structive, of the want of consideration, or other defences
"thereto, whether in payment for a precedent debt or as col"lateral security for a debt, the holder should have the legal
"right to enforce the same against the parties thereto, not"withstanding such a defence might have been good and
"effectual as between the original parties. "
The same rule is also upheld in Michigan,' though both of
these authorities refer rather to taking the paper in payment of
'than as security for an antecedent debt.
In Missouri the decisions have not been as 'uniform as in
some of the other States mentioned. In the first important
case on the subject, Goodman v. Simonds,2 it was held that

taking negotiable paper as collateral security for a pre-existing
debt, without more, would not free it from antecedent equities.
This case afterward went to the Supreme Court of the United
States, where the decision of the State Court was reversed. 8
Again, in Brainardv. Reeves,4 the Supreme Court of Missouri
followed the rule they had previously laid down in Goodman v.
Simonds, though in that case the Qourt said that had the
paper been transferred in absolute payment of the debt, it
would not have been liable to the equities between the original
parties. In the cases of Grantv. Redwel 3 and Boatman's Saving Institution v. Holland,6 the Court decided that taking negotiable paper as collateral security for an antecedent debt,
freed the paper from pre-existing equities-likewise in the
later case of Davis v. Carson.7 Hence I think it may be said
that the question is unsettled in Missouri.
In New Jersey the law was laid down by Chief Justice Green,
in Allaire v. Hartshorne,' with great ability, and has been adhered to ever since.
In North Carolina the question seems never to have come
Bostwick v. Dodge, i Dougl. 413; Outhwaile v. Porter,i3Mich. 583.
2 19

Missouri io6.

3 20 Howard 343.

42 Missouri Appeal Cases 492.
5 30 Mo. 457.
r 38 Mo. 50.
7 69 Mo. 607.
8 I Zabriskie 655.
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squarely before the Court,1 though all distinction between taking in payment and as collateral security seems to be repudiated.
In Rhode Island the rule was very forcibly laid down by
Judge Bosworth, in Bank of Republic v. Carrington,Iin the de-

cision of which case he says, after criticising the opposing
authorities: "The indorsing over of a note for the purpose of
"paying a debt ought to be held as much for valuable con"sideration as the transferring it for a new purchase, and the
"indorsing over of such a note for securing a debt heretofore
"contracted as for one presently incurred. It is held by the
"Courts, with scarcely an exception, that the transferring of a
"note to secure payment for a present purchase is in the usual
"course of business. And why is it not so when transferred to
"secure a debt due, and which ought to be paid or secured be"fore new liabilities are contracted? On the ground of impor"tance for commercial purposes, we do not see why negotiable
"instruments should not have credit and currency for the pay"ment of or securing debts, as well as for the purchasing of
"goods, or the raising of cash. It is often quite as impor"tant to business men, in commercial transactions, that they
"should be able to pay or secure their debts, and make use of
"current paper for those purposes, as it is that they should
"make new purchases, or sell such paper sometimes at ruinous
"sacrifices for the purpose of raising money with which to pay
"'their debts."
In South Carolina the same ruling is made. 3
In Vermont the rule was maintained with remarkable force
by the very able and eminent Judge Redfield&, in the case of
Atkinson v. Brooks,' wherein he reviews the decisions of the
English and American Courts with great ingenuity and sound
reasoning. In the course of his opinion he says : "He certainly
"does forego the pursuit of his own debt, and thus certainly
"puts himself in a different and, in law, a worse situation, and
"this must be regarded as, frina fade, a foregoing of some
"advantage by the indorsee, and also an accommodation to
"the indorser, who may fairly be presumed to prefer this mode

I Reddick v. Jones, 6 Iredell

807.

25 Rhode Island 523. See, also, Colt v. Doyle, 7 Rhode Island 550.
3
Bank of Charlestonv. Chaimber, iI Rich. 657.
4 26 Vermont 569.
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'of meeting his debt. The transaction, therefore, possesses
"both the cardinal ingredients which constitute the text-book
"definition of a valuable consideration; it is a detriment to
"the promisee, and an advantage to the promisor. And it
"is no satisfactory answer to the case to say the party who
"takes such bill or note, which proves unproductive, is in the
"same position as he was before.
"This is by no means certain; he has, for the time, foregone
"the collection of his debt, and, in such matters, time is the
"essence of the transaction, and the debtor thereby gains time
"-it
may be more or less--but, of necessity, some time is
"gained, and, in such matters, this is always accounted an
"advantage, and is often of the most vital consequence to the
"debtor.
How, then, can it fairly be said that this mere sus"pension of debt, during the currency of the note or bill, is no
"consideration?
It seems to me such reasoning upon other
"subjects-indeed upon any subject where one is not pressed
"to the wall by the necessities of his case-would almost be
"regarded as frivolous; surely it is scarcely specious."
And again, in the same case, he says: "According to the gen"eral commercial usage, there is, then, no essential difference in
" principle whether a current note or bill is taken in payment
"or as collateral security for a prior debt, provided the note is
"in both cases truly and unqualifiedly negotiated so as to impose
"upon the holder the obligation to conform to the general
"rules of the law merchiant in enforcing payment. If, indeed,
"the note or bill is not so negotiated as to make the holder a
"party to it or so as to require of him to pursue the strict
"rules of mercantile usage in making demand of payment,
"and giving notice of dishonor, so as to charge his indorser
"with all the prior parties upon the peril of making the note
"or bill his own, in payment of his debt, then he could not be
"regarded probably as having so taken the paper in the due
"course of business bona fide and for value as to shut out
"equitable defences existing between the original parties.
"But ordinarily we suppose it fair to conclude that one who
"takes a note or bill negotiated to him while current, although
"merely as collateral to a prior debt, is expected to pursue the
"same course in enforcing payment as if he paid money for
"the bill. And it is scarcely supposable that one so taking
"security for a debt will not conduct differently on account of
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"the security. It is 6f necessity that he should, if he puts
"any confidence in the ultimate availability, and one would
"scarcely part with such security unless he expected more or
"less indulgence by or on account of it. And when the prior
"debt is suffered to remain uncollected, it is, under the circum"stances, fair to conclude such was the stipulation. And the
"case of one who takes a note or bill so negotiated, whether
"in payment or security for a prior debt, implicitly stipulating
"to forego the collection until maturity of the collateral paper,
"when such paper proves unproductive, is the same in both
" alternatives."
Here it will be seen that Judge Redfield rests his argument
on the ground that there is an implied agreement by the creditor to suspend his remedies during that period, and that this
implied agreement constitutes the true consideration for the
taking and holding of the collateral paper.'
And this is probably the most plausible theory of all for
working out this doctrine in relation to such transactions. It
is admitted that if the indorsee gives time on his original debt,
he is protected. But it is contended that, if he does not
expressly agree to give time, he in fact does not give any.
Now, this is a question of presumptions, and the presumption
must be drawn from experience in such matters. To say that
such is not the real object of the transaction is, it seems to me,
at variance with the general experience of men whose business
necessarily makes them familiar with such arrangements.
This decision has been followed by many others in that State;
but it is sufficient to mention a few others.'
This about completes the review of those States whose Courts
hold to the opinion in Swift v. Tyson, except, perhaps, some
few 'minor States which, in a general view, it is not important
to consider.
'See Manning v. McClure, 36 Ill. 49o , where the same position is
taken by Judge Lawrence, who says it is ordinarily fair to presume that
although there may not have been an express agreement to forbear, yet

it is necessarily implied from the nature of the transaction and the
object which the parties had in view. See, also, Curriev. Misa, L. R.,
io Exchequer 153-163.
2Dixon v. Dixon, 31 Vermont 450;

Russell v. Sfiater, 47 Vt. 273;
Quin v. Hard,43 Vt. 375. But see Austin v. Curtis, 31 Vt. 67, opinion
by Bennett, J.
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It may be well to state that the transaction is governed by
the law of the place where the pledge is made. Thus, if a
broker in New York, to whom negotiable securities are intrusted upon which to raise money for the owner, deliver them
as security for a pre-existing debt of his own in Massachusetts,
or any other State, by the law of which the receiving of a negotiable note as security for a pre-existing debt shuts out all equities between the original parties. the transfer must be dealt with
according to the law of Massachusetts, or any other State in
which the pledge may be made; and the pledgee, taking such
securities in good faith before maturity, obtains a good title to
them to the amount pledged.' But if a negotiable note be delivered in New York as security for an antecedent debt, the
transaction is governed by the law of that State, and in a suit
upon such note in another State, where the rule is that one
taking paper as security for a precedent debt is a holder for
value, in the usual course of business, the law of New York,
that such transfer does not constitute one a holder for value,
must be applied.'
It might also be stated, in completing the review upon this
subject, that when lands or chattels are pledged as security for
an antecedent debt, they do not follow the general ruling as to
negotiable paper, and one who takes them as such will take
such title subject to all the equities between the original parties,
and will not be a purchaser for value.'
It will be seen from the consideration of this question in
the several State Courts that they are divided into two
classes, as to their ruling on this question: one class holding
that an antecedent debt does constitute a consideration sufficient to support a transfer of negotiable paper as security, and
the other denying such a conclusion.
Text-writers everywhere, in treating of this subject, say that
such a debt does constitute a valuable consideration; and, it
seems to me, it is impossible to maintain to the contrary, unless
the debt is not due, or the new security is of that nature that
no trust can be reposed in it. These cases are, of course, very
rare. In almost every case, the creditor will proceed differently
1 Culver v. Benedict, 13 Gray 7.

Russell v. Buck, 14 Vt. 147.
.12

Leading Cases in Equity, 3d Ed. lO4: Sraug-ham v. fairchild,

So Md. 598; Bank v. Bates, r20 U. S. 556.
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on the faith of the new security than if no such security were
given; and this will naturally delay the collection of his debt
until he realizes upon the new security; and then if that is
taken away from him, it is impossible to put him in his former
position, and, as in several of the cases cited, he has virtually
lost his debt by being lulled into inaction on the strength of
the new security, and with only a very remote possibility of
ever recovering at all upon the original debt.
Such a condition of affairs will, it is manifest, work great
injustice, even more so than in the past, as the commerce
of our nation is increasing with great rapidity. As such transactions have grown out of the necessities of trade and business,
so they will continue to increase with the increasing population
and prosperity of our country.
Consequently, it is to be hoped that before many years our
State Courts will adopt the better and, it seems to me, the
more sensible views of the English and of our Federal Courts
upon this question, and not expend so much time and labor
in trying to determine and explain the precise difference between taking a note or bill "on account of," "in payment of,"
"as collateral to" or "as security for" an existing debt.
No one whose mind is not accustomed to drawing such hairbreadth distinctions would ever contend for a moment that it
made any essential difference in the legal rights of the creditor
whether he took the paper as security for an existing debt, or
as payment of such debt. In either case he ought to have the
full benefit of all the securities until he has obtained full satisfaction of his debt.
To be consistent, we must either accept the New York rule,
that in both cases there is no value given for the note or bill,
or else insist that value is given in both cases.
A negotiable instrument is, in effect, a contract made by the
obligor or promisor to pay any and every man who shall take
the instrument on the faith of his word and give value for it;
and from this it follows that, whenever the instrument is transferred, a new contract arises; and such paper, passing as it does
by delivery, is treated as a species of money which the necessities of trade require, and therefore render current, and is subject to the same rules as the money it represents.
The law relating to collateral security given for loans of
money, discounts of bills of exchange, promissory notes and

